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Abstract
The Ghanaian financial sector was in severe distress in 1985 after a decade of high and
variable rates of inflation, low economic growth, and financial policies ill-suited to the
country’s goals. Ghana, with World Bank support, implemented a Financial Sector
Adjustment Program (FINSAP) between 1988-1997. To comply with the FINSAP, the
Government established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) as a
temporary public asset management company under Provisional National Defence Council
Law 242 on February 28, 1990, with an initial 6-year statutory life, for the purpose of: 1)
facilitating the restructuring and recapitalization of major state-owned banks; 2) expediting
the restructuring of public- and private-enterprises; and 3) maximizing recovery value of
non-performing assets (NPAs) to reduce the Government’s fiscal burden. NPART was given
a Cedi 18 billion ($500 million) Aggregate Recovery Target out of a total of Cedi 50 billion in
acquired NPAs. By NPART’s cessation on June 30, 1997, recovery was approximately Cedi
19.6 billion, or about 10% above the target. Evaluations indicated that the aggregate
condition of restructured state-owned banks had improved, representing a satisfactory
performance overall. However, NPART was also criticized for lacking institutional
independence, transparency, and an overall legal framework. Moreover, the use of NPART to
facilitate corporate restructuring became politically difficult and most of the assets were
ultimately liquidated.
Keywords: Ghana, World Bank, Asset Management Company, Non-Performing Assets,
Corporate Restructuring, Developing Economies

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management programs.
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Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (NPART)
At a Glance
Between 1970-82, Ghana experienced
political instability accompanied by
economic stagnation and inflation. The
Ghanaian financial sector was also in severe
distress, characterized by an insolvent
banking system and high levels of nonperforming assets (NPAs). As a result,
Ghana implemented several IMF and World
Bank programs with a macroeconomic
stability focus.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To hold non-performing assets transferred
to NPART on behalf of the State; to take any
necessary action to recover all amounts outstanding;
to administer and manage the Non-Performing
Assets Recovery Fund.
Launch Dates Announcement: February
28, 1990
Wind-down Dates Ceased Operations: June
30, 1997
Size and Type of Cedi 62.7 billion (approx.
NPL Problem 10% of GDP or 40% of
banking assets) of NPLs
caused by credit-allocation
policies and currency
devaluations
Program Size No legal limit
Eligible Institutions Formally all banks eligible
Open- and closed-bank
Usage NPAs worth Cedi 50 billion
transferred
Outcome Recovered Cedi 19.6 billion
NPAs
NPL ratio in restructured
banks fell from 72.5% to
28.5% between 1989 and
1993
Ownership Public
Structure
Notable Features PNDCL 242 gave NPART
broad legal authority;
established a specialized
loan-recovery tribunal

Ghana implemented a World Bank Financial
Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) in
1988 financed by Financial Sector
Adjustment Credits (FINSAC) I and II. To
comply with the FINSAP, Ghana enacted
PNDCL 242 on February 28, 1990. PNDCL
242 established the Non-Performing Assets
Recovery Trust (NPART), a public asset
management company with an initial 6-year
statutory life. Initially, NPART recapitalized
and restructured distressed state-owned
banks. Non-performing assets were
transferred from banks’ portfolios at book
value, excluding interest. NPAs were
replaced with Bank of Ghana-issued FINSAP
bonds, which yielded 7-9% per annum with
maturities of between two and five years.
Later, NPART was also involved in
corporate restructuring by facilitating
financial work-out arrangements for selected potentially viable enterprises. This included
debt moratoriums, rescheduling, and conversion into subordinated debt. During NPART’s
operation, approximately 13,000 accounts were transferred; these were comprised of
corporate loans to public- and private-sector enterprises across disparate industries, mostly
collateralized by plant, equipment, and machinery. NPART was given a Cedi 18 billion
Aggregate Recovery Target out of a total of Cedi 50 billion in acquired NPAs (the exchange
rate for US $1 varied from Cedi 181 in February 1988 to Cedi 2000 in July 1997). By NPART’s
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cessation, recovery was approximately Cedi 19.6 billion, or about 10% above the target,
representing a satisfactory performance.
Summary Evaluation
Standardized performance indicators (i.e., NPL ratio, return on equity) indicated that by
1995, the overall condition of restructured state-owned banks had improved. However,
NPART was also criticized for lacking institutional independence, transparency, and an
overall legal framework. Moreover, the use of NPART to facilitate corporate restructuring
became politically difficult and most assets were ultimately liquidated instead.
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Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust: Ghana Context
GDP
$5.3 billion in 1989
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$5.9 billion in 1990
USD)
GDP per capita
$366 in 1989
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$399 in 1990
USD)
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
Data not available in 1989
debt)
Data not available in 1990
Size of banking system
$160 million in 1989
$240 million in 1990
Size of banking system as a percentage of
3% of 1989 GDP
GDP
4% of 1990 GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
Data not available in 1989
financial system
Data not available in 1990
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Data not available in 1989
Data not available in 1990
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available in 1989
Data not available in 1990
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available in 1989
Data not available in 1990
Existence of deposit insurance
None in 1989
None in 1990
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Overview

Background
Between 1970-82, the Ghanaian economy experienced political instability and a severe
macroeconomic crisis characterized by low economic growth, negligible domestic savings
and investment, and high and variable inflation (World Bank 1988). Figure 1 depicts the high
inflation and recurrent recessions characteristic of the period.
Figure 1: Ghana’s Economic Crisis

Source: International Monetary Fund and International Financial Statistics 1968-1999a; 19681999b.
In 1983 the Ghanaian government, then a military junta called the Provisional National
Defence Council (PNDC) under the rule of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, adopted the
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) intended to improve the country’s general economic
management, with a specific emphasis on macroeconomic stability (World Bank 1997b). The
ERP was supported by a series of structural adjustment programs with the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund aimed at reducing macroeconomic imbalances and
liberalizing the external sector (World Bank 1997b). However, it quickly became clear to
stakeholders that the sustainability of Ghana’s long-term economic recovery would also
require the restructuring of the highly distressed and mostly government-owned financial
sector (Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000).
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Ghana’s Financial Sector
The Government and the Bank of Ghana (BOG), with support from the World Bank, carried
out a major financial sector review in 1987 (World Bank 1997b). The review described a
technically insolvent banking system dominated by state-owned banks that were burdened
with non-performing assets and excessive intermediation costs; a low level of financial
intermediation reflecting a poor record of domestic resource mobilization; a lack of public
confidence in the banking sector; the virtual absence of a money or capital market; and the
weakness of the BOG’s banking system supervision and regulatory framework (World Bank
1997b). The Government also strictly regulated loan and deposit rates, leading to inefficient
credit allocation (World Bank 1997b). For example, in the 1980s, the Government
maintained sectoral interest rate ceilings in an effort to promote certain sectors such as
agriculture (World Bank 1997a). The artificially low interest rates combined with doubledigit inflation meant that rates were often negative in real terms, limiting bank profitability
and slowly degrading any existing capital base.
As shown in Figure 2, Ghana’s banking sector consisted of six commercial banks, three
sectoral development banks, a merchant bank, a small cooperative bank, and approximately
a hundred rural banks that were owned and managed by their local communities (World
Bank 1988).
Figure 2: Ghana’s banking sector

The primary commercial banks GCB, SCB, and Barclays dominated the banking sector and
accounted for approximately 57% of the banking systems’ Cedi 156 billion in assets, roughly
equivalent to $862 million or 25% of GDP (World Bank 1988).3 The Government-owned GCB
accounted for about half of systemwide assets and deposits. Barclays, SCB, and BCCG were
local subsidiaries of large international banks. All but one commercial bank, BCCG, were
either partly or wholly owned by the government (World Bank 1988).

Exchange rate for US $1: Cedi 181 (February 1988), Cedi 383 Auction Rate (November 1991), Cedi 920.75
(May 1994), Cedi 2000 (July 1997). Ghana suffered from high inflation rates throughout the duration of the
program.
3
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Figure 3 shows the technical insolvency of Ghana’s banking sector according to aggregate
balance sheet statements published by the World Bank, including the three foreign bank
subsidiaries (World Bank 1995).
Figure 3: Insolvency in Ghana’s banking sector

Source: World Bank 1995.
The financial-sector review also revealed the source of the banking sectors’ non-performing
assets as highly distressed Ghanaian public- and private-sector enterprises. The
Government, in agreement with the World Bank, realized that any successful bank
restructuring process on a long-term, sustainable basis would require the implementation
of a corporate restructuring program as well (World Bank 1991).
The World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment Program
The diagnoses from the financial sector review formed the basis for the adoption of a
comprehensive World Bank technical assistance program, known as a Financial Sector
Adjustment Program (FINSAP). The FINSAP aimed to provide technical assistance for Ghana
to: restructure the six distressed state-owned banks; strengthen the BOG’s regulatory and
supervisory framework; develop capital and financial markets; and generally improve the
strength of the financial sector (World Bank 1997b). The World Bank (1997b) arranged
$106.6 million in funding for the first phase of the FINSAP (1988-91) and $100 million for
the second phase (1991-97). Both credit amounts were made to the Government at World
Bank terms with 40-year maturities. The two credit programs, known as Financial Sector
Adjustment Credits I and II, were co-financed by the African Development Bank, the Swiss
Government, and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan (World Bank 1997b).

182

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 2

The objectives of the bank restructuring component of the programs were outlined under a
comprehensive Policy Matrix.4
The bank restructuring component of FINSAC I began with “comprehensive external
diagnostic audits” of Coop Bank, the commercial banks—save for the smaller BCCG—and the
development banks (World Bank 1988). This would provide a basis for determining the
prospect of restructuring and any necessary financial measures by the Government. The
Government went ahead with restructuring seven state-owned banks, which were all
distressed. The General Framework provided the broad guidelines for the bank
restructuring program and was approved by the Government in July 1989 (World Bank
1991). The General Framework included a “one-time” financial package of measures tailored
to specific requirements for each distressed bank to “restore solvency, and to provide
sufficient capital and adequate liquidity” (World Bank 1991). The understanding was that
the restructuring, recapitalization, and removal of non-performing assets would eventually
prepare the major banks for public sector divestiture (World Bank 1991).
Detailed portfolio audits of the distressed banks had revealed that the aggregate amount of
non-performing assets was approximately Cedi 62.7 billion in 1989 (World Bank 1995). The
Government, the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA), and external
consultants in early 1989 concluded that the best option for restructuring, while minimizing
the fiscal burden to the Government, would be the establishment of a Government-owned
public asset management company (AMC; World Bank 1995).
Under FINSAC I, the Government also commissioned a study to evaluate the magnitude and
extent of Ghanaian corporate distress, and to “recommend a program to facilitate the
restructuring of potentially viable enterprises” (PVEs; World Bank 1991). The report
concluded that a significant number of examined enterprises were potentially viable if
restructured. Following the report, identified PVEs were recommended to undergo
restructuring under the corporate restructuring program (CRP; World Bank 1991).
Program Description
NPART Legal Authority
Recognizing the need to support the FINSAP, Ghana’s Government enacted the NonPerforming Assets (Loans, Investments) Recovery Trust Law, 1990, Provisional National
Defence Council Law 242 (PNDCL 242) on February 28, 1990, pursuant to the PNDC
Proclamation 1981 (PNDCL 242 1990). The PNDCL 242 established a temporary stand-alone
government agency, the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) which became
“operational later that year” (World Bank 1995). Under the law, NPART had the legal power
to “acquire, hold, and dispose of any movable or immovable property or enter into any
contract or transaction” (PNDCL 242 1990). The NPART’s mandate was to: 1) hold any
transferred non-performing assets on behalf of the Government; 2) take such action as

4

See Appendix A: FINSAC I and II Policy Implementation Matrix for Bank Restructuring.
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necessary to recover all outstanding value; and 3) administer and manage the NonPerforming Assets Recovery Fund (PNDCL 242 1990).
The 1990 law required that NPART should carry out its mandate within a 5-year time frame,
plus a built-in 1-year extension (World Bank 1995). To facilitate NPART’s loan recovery, a
special judiciary tribunal called the “Non-Performing Assets Recovery Tribunal” was also
established under Part II of PNDCL 242 (1990). The Tribunal became operational by October
1992, allowing NPART to initiate liquidation proceedings (World Bank 1997a).
NPART Operating Policies
NPART’s financial and operational guidelines, as well as its organizational structure were
outlined under a document titled “NPART Operating Policies” (World Bank 1995). Under the
guidelines, non-performing loans (NPLs) were transferred at book value excluding interest,
with NPART authorized to recover value from debtors and administer the proceeds
(Klingebiel 2000). All NPLs to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other Government
guaranteed obligations were removed from banks’ portfolios and offset against Government
claims (i.e., deposits), with any remaining balances converted into BOG-issued FINSAP bonds
(Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000). The NPLs to the private sector were to be replaced through
the issuance of FINSAP bonds, after a process of verification (World Bank 1997a). The BOGissued FINSAP bonds yielded 7-9% per annum (Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000).5
Furthermore, the FINSAP bonds issued to the banks provided “for some of these bonds to be
discounted at the Bank of Ghana, if liquidity became a problem” (World Bank, June 1997).
Thus, this additional usage of indirect monetary instruments “addressed both the solvency
and short-term liquidity needs of affected banks, while also avoiding the risks of high-cost
borrowing” (World Bank 1997a).
NPART was governed and supervised by a Board of Trustees (the Board) which consisted of
members appointed by the PNDC. The Board was responsible for all aspects of management
and supervision of NPART, including hiring of employees, consultants, and advisors (PNDCL
242 1990). As a World Bank-IDA program, NPART also received substantial technical
assistance, mainly through a team of external consultants, “two of whom had previous
relevant experience with the Resolution Trust Corporation of the United States” (World Bank
1995).
Public disclosure requirements under the NPART Operating Polices were relatively limited.
Annual audited financial reports were submitted to the Board of Trustees, the Ministry of
Finance, the BOG, and the FINSAP Implementation Secretariat (Klingebiel 2000).
Additionally, annual reports on NPART’s management were submitted to the Provisional
Defense Council for review (PNDCL 242 1990).

5

The bonds were referred to as both FINSAP and FINSAC bonds in various World Bank documents.
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NPART Recovery of Non-Performing Assets
Pursuant to Part I, Section 7 of PNDCL 242, NPART could sell non-performing assets “at the
best price realizable” and “take such actions as may be necessary for the recovery of nonperforming assets” (PNDCL 242 1990). NPART was also empowered to “negotiate and
reschedule payments of transferred non-performing assets” and finally, “take any other
action which is incidental” to NPART’s objectives (PNDCL 242 1990). Under NPART’s action
program, recovery efforts focused on the 250 largest accounts (in excess of Cedi 20 million
each) representing 89 percent or Cedi 44.3 billion of the aggregate Cedi 49.5 billion in nonperforming assets (World Bank 1991).
Moreover, NPART also assisted FINSAP’s corporate restructuring program. NPART was
required to designate distressed enterprises into non-viable or potentially viable categories
(World Bank 1991). The objective of the CRP was to eventually encourage the private sector
to promote the rehabilitation of the PVEs, through new venture-capital companies (World
Bank 1991). Figure 4 depicts the overall structure of FINSAP, and how NPART was utilized
as a tool under the bank restructuring component.
Figure 4: FINSAP structure

Source: World Bank 1991.
Outcomes
The NPART was authorized and established on February 28, 1990, as a temporary
government entity (World Bank 1995). The initial authorization required that NPART should
carry out its mandate within a 6-year time frame, however a “slackening in the pace of
recovery” in 1995, as well as the “need to wind up residual operations” meant NPART’s
mandate was “extended by 18 months” (World Bank 1997b). Throughout the duration of
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NPART’s operations, about 13,000 accounts were transferred for management (Klingebiel
2000). The assets transferred to NPART consisted of corporate loans to public- and privatesector enterprises across disparate industries and sectors, most of which were collateralized
by plant, equipment, and machinery (Klingebiel 2000). A total of Cedi 50 billion in face value
was transferred (World Bank 1997b).
Figure 5 shows the total value of non-performing assets transferred to NPART from the
banks participating in FINSAP. The largest contributors of non-performing assets were the
two commercial banks, GCB (Cedi 14.3 billion) and SSB (Cedi 12.6 billion), and a sectoral
development bank, BHC (Cedi 12.9 billion). The GCB was especially notable as the dominant
state-owned bank that controlled about half of the Ghanaian banking sectors’ assets and
deposits (World Bank 1997b).
Figure 5: Non-Performing Assets Transferred to NPART by Ghanaian Banks

Source: Brownbridge & Gockel 1996.
As a result of the financial measures implemented under the General Framework, 6 of the 7
state-owned restructured banks were able to meet capital adequacy requirements by the
end of 1990 (World Bank 1991). The same 6 restructured state-owned banks were able to
substantially reduce their percentage of NPLs in relation to total outstanding portfolio as
shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Non-Performing Loan Ratio of Restructured Banks

Source: World Bank 1995
Of the 250 largest accounts that NPART’s action program focused on, 203 accounts
constituting Cedi 38.45 billion of NPART’s total assets had been resolved by April 1993
(Klingebiel 2000). Those accounts were resolved as follows (Klingebiel 2000):6
•

Foreclosures for 94 firms with Cedi 14.5 billion;

•

Restructuring for 89 firms with Cedi 12.9 billion;

•

Payment at full/discounted value for 10 firms with Cedi 0.4 billion;

•

Write-offs for 3 firms with Cedi 1.5 billion;

•

Other for 7 firms with Cedi 9.2 billion.

By the time NPART had ceased operations on June 30, 1997, it had recovered approximately
Cedi 19.6 billion in value for the Government which was about 10% above the initial
Aggregate Recovery Target of 36%.7
Overall, the outcome represented a “satisfactory performance” under the World Bank’s
program implementation report Policy Matrix (World Bank 1997b).8 A comparative survey
Klingebiel 2000 cited these figures in a World Bank paper. As NPART was terminated in June 30, 1997, the
final values may have been different.
7 See Appendix B: NPART recoveries.
8 See Appendix A: FINSAC I and II Policy Implementation Matrix for Bank Restructuring.
6

187

Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust

Matsumoto

of standardized performance indicators suggested that, by 1995, the collective operational
performance of the restructured state-owned banks was similar to the performance of
foreign-owned banks (World Bank 1997b).
The standardized performance indicators included: ratio of operating costs to average total
assets; ratio of arrears (principal and interest) as a percentage of total outstanding portfolio;
percentage of non-performing portfolio (i.e., loans affected by arrears) in relation to total
outstanding portfolio; ratio of actual loan collections as a percentage of scheduled
collections; return on shareholders’ equity; and return on average total assets (World Bank
1991).
Finally, while NPART was initially intended to facilitate corporate restructuring, the process
became “mired in political problems and assets were basically sold-off” (Klingebiel 2000).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: NPART was implemented as part of the Financial Sector
Adjustment Program (FINSAP) alongside other World Bank and IMF programs.
The World Bank-IDA FINSAP was a comprehensive and complex reform of Ghana’s financial
sector during a period of intense financial distress and macroeconomic imbalances. FINSAP’s
package of financial reforms was implemented alongside other World Bank and IMF
structural adjustment programs, which aimed to reduce macroeconomic imbalances and
liberalize the external sector (World Bank 1997b).
FINSAP was structured in two phases. Under FINSAC I, the bank restructuring component
was focused on facilitating the transfer of non-performing assets from distressed banks to
NPART. Under FINSAC II, the bank restructuring component was focused on facilitating the
disposal of non-performing assets transferred to NPART. The program phases were
sequenced: the initial recapitalization and resolution of distressed banks under FINSAC I was
a prerequisite for further reforms, such as public divestiture, under FINSAC II.
In the World Bank’s initial FINSAC I proposal, they considered different options to resolve
financial deficits and to restore solvency to distressed banks. Examples of considered options
include capital injections, debt rescheduling, and “transfer to the Government of nonperforming loans to state enterprises and/or guaranteed by Government” (World Bank
1995). Cedi 22.6 billion in loans to public enterprises was removed from bank portfolios
under FINSAC I and replaced by claims on the government (World Bank 1997).
The decision to use a public asset management company for the recovery of non-performing
assets, as opposed to alternative strategies, was a direct result of technical discussions
between the Government, the World Bank IDA, and external independent consultants.
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2. Legal Authority: Ghana’s government enacted the Non-Performing Assets
Recovery Trust Law, 1990 (PNDCL 242), establishing NPART and giving it broad
legal powers.
The use of NPART as a public asset management company was authorized by Ghana’s
Provisional National Defence Council after the Non-Performing Assets (Loans, Investments)
Recovery Trust Law, 1990—Provisional National Defence Council Law 242 (PNDCL 242)—
was adopted on February 28, 1990, pursuant to the PNDC Proclamation 1981 (PNDCL 242
1990). The PNDC authorized NPART after recognizing the need to rescue the distressed
banks experiencing adverse effects on the credit and investment quality of their portfolios
(PNDCL 242 1990). Part I of PNDCL 242 stated the establishment, objectives, and functions
of NPART, while Part II established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Tribunal.
The PNDC gave broad legal powers to NPART such as the authority to exercise powers and
actions as it “deems advantageous or necessary for or in connection with the achievement of
its mandate” (PNDCL 242 1990). Pursuant to Part III, Section 27 of PNDCL 242, the PNDC
Secretary responsible for Finance and Economic Planning could “by legislative instrument
make such regulations as may be necessary for the effective and full implementation” of
PNDCL 242 (1990). Finally, NPART was exempt from “the payment of all taxes, rates, and
duties” (PNDCL 242 1990).
3. Special Powers: Part II of PNDCL 242 established the Non-Performing Assets
Recovery Tribunal alongside NPART.
Part II of PNDCL 242 established a special judiciary tribunal called the Non-Performing
Assets Recovery Tribunal (the Tribunal) to facilitate NPART’s loan recovery (PNDCL 242
1990). The Tribunal was set up due to Ghana’s weak legal framework for bank resolution,
debt recovery, and creditors’ rights, which hampered NPART’s ability to recover value for
the Government (Klingebiel 2000). Pursuant to Part II, Section 16 of PNDCL 242, the Tribunal
was comprised of a chairman and two other persons. The chairman of the Tribunal was
required to be a “judge of the Superior Courts not below the rank of a Justice of the Court of
Appeal” or a “person qualified to be appointed to such office” (PNDCL 242 1990). The two
remaining positions were to be filled by other persons appointed by the PNDC “in
consultation with the Chief Justice” (PNDCL 242 1990).
Part II, Section 17 of PNDCL 242 outlined the Tribunal as having exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine all matters arising under PNDCL 242 or relating to any non-performing
asset transferred to NPART (PNDCL 242 1990). The Tribunal had all the powers of the High
Court of Justice in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Part II, Section 18 of PNDCL 242 also outlined that any judgement or order from the Tribunal,
with respect to its legal jurisdiction, was considered final. Any Court entertaining actions or
proceedings with the intent to question the Tribunal’s judgements, findings, or rulings was
considered unlawful (PNDCL 242 1990). Procedurally, the Tribunal was considered “duly
constituted” if the Chairman and “one other member” were present (PNDCL 242 1990).
Under Part II, Section 19 of PNDCL 242, decisions of the Tribunal were determined by a
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majority of the members (PNDCL 242 1990). If convicted, obstructing the Tribunal’s
activities resulted in either a “fine not exceeding Cedi 500,000,” “imprisonment for a term
not exceeding 12 months,” or to both (PNDCL 242 1990). The Tribunal became operational
by October 1992, allowing NPART to initiate liquidation proceedings (World Bank 1997a).
4. Mandate: NPART was set up as an asset disposal agency but later took on the task
of restructuring corporate borrowers.
Beyond acting as an asset disposal agency, NPART also assisted FINSAP’s Corporate
Restructuring Program. NPART was required to evaluate distressed enterprises and place
them into non-viable or potentially viable categories (World Bank 1991). Non-viable
enterprises were liquidated or sold by NPART, while potentially viable enterprises (PVEs)
were candidates for the CRP. Participation in the CRP was limited to enterprises that were
“temporarily experiencing financial distress but with clear medium-term prospects for
profitable operation” demonstrated by a specific restructuring proposal (World Bank 1988).
NPART’s role in the CRP included facilitating financial work-out arrangements for selected
PVEs, with the voluntary participation of Ghanaian banks as follows (World Bank 1991):
a) NPART conducted debt moratoriums, rescheduling,
subordinated debt.

and conversion into

b) Participating Ghanaian banks extended additional credit and/or injected equity with
the expectation that enterprise owners would make their own financial contributions
within their capability.
The objective of the CRP was to eventually encourage the private sector to promote the
rehabilitation of the PVEs through new venture-capital companies, although this proposal
was later rejected (World Bank 1997a).
5. Communication: Public disclosure of NPART’s activities was limited, and NPART
was not required to do so under PNDCL 242.
The PNDCL 242 was notified to the Ghana Gazette on September 21, 1990 (PNDCL 242
1990). Public disclosure requirements under the NPART Operating Polices were relatively
limited. Annual audited financial reports were submitted to the Board of Trustees, the
Ministry of Finance, the BOG, and the FINSAP Implementation Secretariat (Klingebiel 2000).
Additionally, annual reports on NPART’s management were submitted to the Provisional
Defense Council for review (PNDCL 242 1990).
6. Ownership Structure: NPART was owned by the Republic of Ghana.
NPART’s founding legislation did not describe the capital structure of NPART, but the World
Bank (1997) described it as “wholly-owned” by the Ghanaian government. NPART’s first
objective was “to hold for and on behalf of the State any non-performing asset of a bank
which is transferred to the Trust” (PNDCL 242 1990).
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7. Governance/Administration: NPART was governed by the Board of Trustees
pursuant to Part I of PNDCL 242.
The governing body of NPART, the Board of Trustees, consisted of the following members
appointed by the PNDC (PNDCL 242 1990).
•

a Chairman;

•

representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the BOG;

•

the Chief Administrator of the Trust;

•

a chartered accountant from the private sector;

•

a lawyer with expertise in corporate law, and;

•

three experts.

The Board was responsible for the formulation of policies and the supervision of
management of NPART and had the authorization to exercise all legal powers conferred to
NPART (PNDCL 242 1990). Under Part I, Section 10 of PNDCL 242, decisions of the Board
were determined by a simple majority of members present and voting. During instances of a
split vote, the Chairman or the member presiding was entitled to cast the deciding vote.
Moreover, Part I, Section 10 of PNDCL 242 stipulated that any member of the Board that had
a conflict of interest, directly or otherwise, in any issues or decisions, was required to
disclose in writing the nature of the conflict. The member was barred from any discussion
regarding the issue and was also prohibited from voting. Members who failed to disclose a
conflict of interest would be removed from the board and on conviction, be liable to a fine
less than Cedi 500,000 or imprisonment for less than two years (PNDCL 242 1990).
Part I, Section 13 of PNDCL 242 stated that NPART may “engage” employees, consultants,
and advisors as necessary for the function of its mandate, on any terms and conditions that
the Board may determine (PNDCL 242 1990). As mentioned previously, the IDA provided
extensive technical assistance to support the functions of NPART, including hiring external
consultants with previous experience at the US Resolution Trust Corporation (World Bank
1995). Such external advisory support assisted in duties such as “loan classification, asset
evaluation and, asset recovery management for NPART” (World Bank 1991).
8. Governance/Administration: The FINSAP Implementation Secretariat conducted
external oversight of FINSAP implementation and use of FINSAC, including
NPART.
The World Bank installed an Implementation Secretariat to facilitate the effective and
successful implementation of the World Bank-IDA’s FINSAP objectives. The Secretariat was
responsible for “providing guidance, oversight, coordination, and monitoring for all activities
pertaining” to the FINSAP objectives (World Bank 1991).
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The Secretariat was headed by an Executive Director “backed up by a foreign advisor and
initially comprised of three sections, each headed by a Section Chief” (World Bank 1991).
The sections were: 1) Bank Restructuring and NPART; 2) Corporate Restructuring; and 3)
Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Administration and Legal Affairs (World Bank 1991).
9. Size: NPART did not have a legally specified limitation on its total size.
While PNDCL 242 did not set a legal limit to the total size of NPART, the Government
obviously had fiscal constraints. World Bank implementation reports stated that the book
value of NPART’s total portfolio of non-performing assets was about Cedi 50 billion (World
Bank 1997b). There was also no legal individual firm participation limit.
10. Funding Source: Government debt funded asset purchases, while FINSAC I and II
provided funding for technical assistance to NPART.
About Cedi 47.5 billion in FINSAP bonds were issued by the BOG, set to mature between 2 to
5 years and yielding 7-9% per annum (in many instances, the bonds were rolled over for
bonds with interest rates of about 15 percent; World Bank 1994). There is little discussion
about these bonds in the years since NPART was established. Moreover, later World Bank
reports do not mention the Ghanaian government needing assistance for this debt.
The credit disbursed by the World Bank-IDA provided the funding for technical assistance,
staffing, and other operational costs. For example, FINSAC II technical expertise cost
estimates were approximately USD 1,080,000 for foreign loan recovery experts and Cedi
32,500,000 for housing (World Bank 1991). Cost estimates were based on the actual cost of
hiring two full-time and one part-time external expert for NPART over three years (World
Bank 1991).
The tranching of credit disbursed by the World Bank-IDA ensured satisfactory progress in
the implementation of the overall FINSAP and in particular, of the bank restructuring (World
Bank 1997a). As it relates to NPART, credit disbursements were conditional on the
“implementation by NPART of the action program for the recovery of non-performing assets
and for liquidation” including meeting the ART timetable (World Bank 1991).
11. Eligible Institutions: NPART had the ability to direct any bank in Ghana to
participate in the program.
Pursuant to PNDCL 242 (1990), “any bank in Ghana shall at the direction in writing of the
[NPART] transfer to the [NPART] such of its non-performing assets.” As such, NPART had
broad legal authority to direct banks to transfer non-performing assets. In practice, all of
Ghana’s major banks transferred loans to NPART. Though NPLs clustered in seven banks,
even the foreign- and privately owned Barclays Bank of Ghana offloaded NPLs to NPART
(Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000).
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12. Eligible Assets: A broad set of assets was eligible for participation in NPART’s
activities.
Documents surveyed did not detail the character of NPLs. The World Bank (1991) hinted at
the composition of NPART’s portfolio when it blamed government-directed credit allocation
and the exchange rate adjustment in 1983 for the country’s NPLs. Some of these policies
directed banks to loan to unsustainable public enterprises. In any case, the law left the BOG
to determine how non-performing assets would be classified after the government
compensated banks for public-enterprise debt (PNDCL 242 1990). Following international
regulatory practices, the Bank of Ghana classified non-performing assets in three categories:
substandard, doubtful, and loss (World Bank 1995). Non-performing assets were considered
eligible for transfer if they were “in existence at the commencement of [PNDCL 242]” or, in
existence “as determined by the audited account of the bank on [December 31, 1989],
provided that such loans and advances or equity investments were actually on the books of
the bank on [June 30, 1987], even if not identified or determined at that time to be nonperforming” (PNDCL 242 1990). At the recommendation of the Board, the December 31,
1989, cutoff date for eligibility could be extended by a further period of one year, by
“legislative instrument” (PNDCL 242 1990). Klingebiel (2000) said that the eligibility
requirements were “nontransparent and vague.”
13. Acquisition - Mechanics: The Bank of Ghana issued FINSAP bonds to offset
transferred non-performing assets as needed, while the Government offset NPLs
made to public enterprises with loans, deposits, and equity.
Under PNDCL 242, NPART could choose which loans to take. Once NPART received NPLs, it
split them depending on their private or public status. The banks’ NPLs to state-owned
enterprises (SOE) and other Government-guaranteed obligations were removed from banks’
portfolios, transferred to NPART, and offset against government loans, equity, or deposits,
with any remaining balances converted into FINSAP bonds (World Bank 1997; Antwi-Asare
and Addison 2000). The banks’ NPLs to the private sector were replaced through the
issuance of FINSAP bonds by the Bank of Ghana (World Bank 1997a).
The FINSAP bonds issued to the banks provided “for some of these bonds to be discounted
at the Bank of Ghana, if liquidity became a problem” (World Bank 1997a). This additional
usage of indirect monetary instruments “addressed both the solvency and short-term
liquidity needs of affected banks, while also avoiding the risks of high-cost borrowing”
(World Bank 1997a). The World Bank (1994) claimed that, had this “swap not occurred and
banks were required to make loan-loss provisions according to the [reformed] guidelines,
state-owned banks would have continued to show losses and negative net worth.”
14. Acquisition - Pricing: PNDCL 242 gave NPART broad authority in acquiring and
pricing of non-performing assets, which it utilized to acquire assets at book value,
excluding interest.
Pursuant to PNDCL 242 (1990), the transfer price for the non-performing asset “may be
determined by [NPART]” at “such rate; in such form; and subject to such other terms and
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conditions as [NPART] may determine.” In practice, Klingebiel (2000) says, NPART acquired
all non-performing assets at book value excluding accrued interest.
15. Management and Disposal: PNDCL 242 gave NPART broad authority in disposing
non-performing assets, which it used to mainly focus on disposing the largest 250
accounts.
Pursuant to PNDCL 242 (1990), NPART could sell non-performing assets “at the best price
realizable” and “take such actions as may be necessary for the recovery of non-performing
assets.” NPART was also empowered to “negotiate and reschedule payments of transferred
non-performing assets” and finally, “take any other action which is incidental” to NPART’s
objectives (PNDCL 242 1990).
In practice, the Government and IDA staff agreed to an action program with a target recovery
of non-performing assets and monitorable timetable. The action program set an Aggregate
Recovery Target of Cedi 18 billion, compared to a total portfolio of about Cedi 50 billion
(World Bank 1995). This was considered realistic based on an account-by-account review of
its portfolio by NPART.
The World Bank summarized the action program as follows (World Bank 1991):
a) NPART’s recovery efforts focused on the 250 largest accounts (in excess of Cedi 20
million each) representing 89 percent or Cedi 44.3 billion of the aggregate Cedi 49.5
billion in non-performing assets;
b) NPART screened each account for classification into 4 categories (foreclosure, sale,
workout/restructuring, and write-off);
c) Following this classification of each account, NPART assigned a realistic recovery
estimate (percentage and amount) to each individual account; and
d) NPART produced the Aggregate Recovery Target (initially estimated at
approximately Cedi 18 billion) reviewed by the Government and IDA.
NPART then proceeded to attempt recovery in accordance with Annual Recovery Targets set
at 12% in 1991, 22% in 1992, 26% in 1993, 23% in 1994, and the remaining 17% in 1995
(World Bank 1995). The recovery targets themselves were subject to subsequent periodic
review and adjustments (World Bank 1991).
NPART’s Operating Policies stipulated that loan recovery “should allow for reasonable workout arrangements with the debtor” and where work-out arrangements were not feasible,
NPART was to “dispose of productive assets on a going concern basis” (Klingebiel 2000).
Finally, if sale on a going-concern basis failed or appeared unlikely, the asset would be
liquidated (Klingebiel 2000).
NPART’s process of asset sale was through negotiated sales by advertising the “assets subject
to foreclosures in the local papers upon which interested buyers approached NPART”
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(Klingebiel 2000). Purchasers of those assets were “mainly domestic investors and some
foreign investors” (Klingebiel 2000).
16. Timeframe: NPART had a sunset clause of 5-years plus a built-in 1-year extension,
but this was extended by an additional 18 months.
Pursuant to Part III, Section 29 of PNDCL 242, NPART was authorized on February 28, 1990,
as a temporary government entity with a “corporate body” (PNDCL 242 1990). The initial
authorization required that NPART should carry out its mandate within a 5-year time frame
with a built-in 1-year extension upon the recommendation of the PNDC Secretary and the
order of the PNDC (PNDCL 242 1990). However a “slackening in the pace of recovery” in
1995, as well as the “need to wind up residual operations” meant NPART’s mandate was
“extended by 18 months” (World Bank 1997b).

III. Evaluation
NPART successfully aided the recovery of Ghana’s banking system at the expense of its own
debt-recovery performance. As mentioned previously, NPART recovered approximately
Cedi 19.6 billion in value, or about 10% above the initial aggregate recovery target. This
represented a “satisfactory performance” under the World Bank’s program implementation
report (World Bank 1997b). The World Bank stated that “the method used for the recovery
of non-performing assets by the establishment of the NPART, a specialized unit with a timebound life, has been quite successful” in the Lessons Learned section of their FINSAC I
evaluation report (World Bank 1995).
The World Bank Financial Sector Review also stated that the removal of NPLs was “most
significant for Ghana’s financial turnaround” (World Bank 1994). While the yield on the
FINSAP bonds were much lower than rates paid on other BOG securities, “the impact of these
bonds on assets and profitability [was] considerable” given that they replaced NPLs which
required substantial loan-loss provisions, with risk-free assets (World Bank 1994). The
review noted that if the NPLs had not been replaced with FINSAP bonds, and banks were
required to implement loan-loss provisions under the new FINSAP guidelines, state-owned
banks would have continued to be insolvent (World Bank 1994).
However, later academic assessments by the World Bank have suggested that NPART may
not have achieved its objectives beyond satisfying the aggregate recovery target. World Bank
economist Daniela Klingebiel analyzed the effectiveness of NPART and concluded that it did
not achieve the objective of facilitating the restructuring of Ghana’s corporate sector
(Klingebiel 2000). Specifically, she cited NPART’s lack of political independence and
professional management at the decision-making level. As a note, the members of NPART’s
Board of Trustees were selected by recommendation of the Secretary of the PNDC
responsible for Finance and Economic Planning. Furthermore, over 50% of non-performing
assets transferred to NPART were loans to state-owned enterprises (Klingebiel 2000). Such
politically sensitive assets are generally difficult to restructure for a government agency like
NPART that lacked institutional independence (Klingebiel 2000).
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Additionally, the transferred non-performing assets comprised 51% of the banking system’s
total assets, which posed a large burden on NPART’s compromised management ability
(Klingebiel 2000). The broad eligibility criteria under PNDCL 242 meant that NPART also
received a disparate set of non-performing assets that were difficult to recover (Klingebiel
2000). The weak legal framework for bank resolution, debt recovery, and creditors’ rights
also hampered NPART’s ability to recover value for the Government (Klingebiel 2000).
Specifically, commercial laws remained “obsolete,” and it was “difficult to secure collateral
for loans [… and] foreclose on defaulted loans” (World Bank 1997a). The Government
attempted to mitigate the implications of a weak legal framework for NPART by granting it
broad legal powers. However, analyses disagreed on the efficacy of the Tribunal. The World
Bank stated that the NPART tribunal “helped to expedite judgements and execute decisions
in foreclosure cases,” but whether this experience contributed to the broader judicial system
was uncertain (World Bank 1997a). Klingebiel (2000) stated that “NPART was slow to make
use of the Tribunal, which turned out to often side with the debtor.” This may have ultimately
contributed to the mixed performance of NPART overall.
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VI.

Appendixes

Appendix A: FINSAC I and II Policy Implementation Matrix for Bank Restructuring
Republic of Ghana - Financial Sector Adjustment Credit I (Credit 1911-GH) - FINSAP
I Policy Implementation Matrix - “Bank Restructuring” section - (World Bank, June
25, 1997)
Issues/Actions Required

Implementation

Carry out full diagnostic studies by
international auditing firms.

Completed by 1989.

Implement safeguard measures to prevent
further deterioration.

February 1989 directive issued by Bank of
Ghana, which also had been closely
monitoring compliance by banks
undergoing restructuring.
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Recruitment of an advisor on bank
restructuring.

Formulation of framework and timetable
satisfactory to IDA, specifying the
modalities for the restructuring of banks,
in particular: i) measures for dealing with
banks’ portfolios of non-performing loans,
including loans to state-owned
enterprises; ii) rescheduling and
conversion of Government’s loans to
banks.
Agreement with IDA on specific proposals
and targets for a reduction of banks’ nonperforming portfolios (including offbalance sheet items).

Restructuring advisory team started work
in January 1989 under Swiss grant.
General Framework document approved by
Government in July 1989. Implementation
modalities included: i) enabling legislation
for NPART and the Special Tribunal; ii)
operational guidelines for NPART; and iii)
transitional measures to arrest
deterioration and achieve a return to
profitability of restructured banks.

The cleaning up of banks’ portfolios through
replacement of non-performing assets by
Government bonds and/or other offsetting
operations was achieved by 1991-92 for six
of the seven restructured banks, except for
the COOP bank*.
*Note COOP was eventually taken into
receivership by BoG.

Finalization of specific restructuring plans
acceptable for commercial and
development banks.

Restructuring plans for six of the seven
distressed banks were completed by end1990, reviewed by IDA, and implemented
since. The one exception was COOP bank.

Republic of Ghana - Financial Sector Adjustment Credit II (Credit 2318-GH) FINSAP II Policy Implementation Matrix - “Bank Restructuring and Loan Recovery
by NPART” section - (World Bank. June 25, 1997)
Issues/Actions Required

Implementation

Commence liquidation of
non-viable enterprises in

Before negotiations, the Government, in consultation with
IDA, developed an action project for the recovery of non-
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performing assets and for liquidations, including agreed
upon annual recovery targets.
In fulfillment of second and third tranche release
conditions, NPART’s recoveries were satisfactory,
aggregating Cedi 19.6 billion (by March 31, 1997),
compared to the initial target of Cedi 18 billion (World
Bank, December 22, 1997).

Consolidate, deepen, and
streamline the ongoing
bank restructuring project
started under FINSAC I.

Before negotiations, the government agreed to establish a
project, including performance indicators, for monitoring
the performance of banks. For the release of the second
tranche, the Government agreed that the Bank of Ghana
would comply with the requirement of annual inspection of
banks in accordance with the Banking Law.
During 1992-93, annual on-site inspections were carried
out for all banks operating in Ghana (commercial,
development, and merchant banks).

Appendix B: NPART recoveries
Year

Recoveries (Cedi billion)

1991

3.31

1992

3.36

1993

3.23

1994

4.09

1995

2.35

1996

2.34

Source: Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000, table A5.7.
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